Bush, Cheney (Wurmser) on Iran

9/20/2007

Why Bush won't attack Iran
By: Steve Clemons
Salon/Washington Note
September 19, 2007

 

Despite saber-rattling, and the Washington buzz that a strike is coming, the president doesn't intend to bomb Iran. Cheney may have other ideas... an engineered provocation, an "end run", an "accidental war" would escalate quickly

 

________

 

During
a recent high-powered Washington dinner party attended by 18 people,
Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft squared off across the table
over whether President Bush will bomb Iran.

 

Brzezinski,
former national security advisor to President Carter, said he believed
Bush's team had laid a track leading to a single course of action: a
military strike against Iran's
nuclear facilities. Scowcroft, who was NSA to Presidents Ford and the
first Bush, held out hope that the current President Bush would hold
fire and not make an already disastrous situation for the U.S. in the Middle East even worse.

 

The 18
people at the party, including former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir
Bhutto, then voted with a show of hands for either Brzezinski's or
Scowcroft's position. Scowcroft got only two votes, including his own.
Everyone else at the table shared Brzezinski's fear that a U.S. strike against Iran is around the corner.

 

In the national debate about America's next moves in the Middle East, an irrepressible and perhaps irresponsible certainty that America will attack Iran
now dominates commentary across the political spectrum. Nerves are
further frayed by stories like this one, about the Pentagon making a
list of 2,000 military targets inside Iran.

 

The left -- and much of the old-school, realist right -- fears that Bush means to bomb Iran
sometime between now and next spring. Both would like to rally public
opinion against the strike before it happens. The neoconservative
right, meanwhile, is asserting that we will bomb Iran but that we need to get to it posthaste.

 

But
both sides are advancing scenarios that are politically useful to them,
and both sides are wrong. Despite holding out a military option,
ratcheting up tensions with Iran about meddling in Iraq and Afghanistan, and deploying carrier strike-force groups in the Persian Gulf, the president is not planning to bomb Iran.
But there are several not-unrelated scenarios under which it might
happen, if the neocon wing of the party, led by Vice President Cheney,
succeeds in reasserting itself, or if there is some kind of
"accidental," perhaps contrived, confrontation.

 

One of
the reasons so many believe action is near is the well-known
neoconservative preference that it be so. There is still a strong
neoconservative faction within the Bush team, and their movement allies
outside the administration, such as Michael Ledeen, John Bolton and
Norman Podhoretz, have openly advocated striking Iran before it can develop nuclear weapons. The neoconservatives believe that in the end, Bush's team will indeed launch a military strike against Iran, or will nudge Israel to do so.

 

There is also evidence that the administration has given serious thought to the bombing option.

 

In June 2006, I helped organize a round table on Iran for the New America Foundation,
where I work, that attracted some heavy hitters in the national
security world, including some of the names associated with the Aspen
Strategy Group co-chaired by Brent Scowcroft and former National
Intelligence Council chairman and Harvard Kennedy School
dean Joseph Nye. As at the Aspen Strategy Group, comments made in my
session were on a "not for attribution" basis. Several current and
former Bush administration officials were in attendance.

 

I
moderated the session. The task of those participating was to think and
talk through the "unthinkables." On the one hand, was an Iran with nukes so hard to live with that the potentially disastrous consequences of an attack, even if it negated Iran's nuclear gains, would be worth it? Would an Iran
with nukes be less paranoid about its security and thus less prone to
meddling in other countries, or would it use the nukes as a shield to
protect itself while continuing to finance terrorism?

 

Alternatively, if we bombed Iran would we be prepared to cede American primacy over the world's fossil fuel regime and see Iran, China and Russia develop what Flynt Leverett calls a "new axis of oil"?

 

Would we be prepared for a post-bombing terrorist superhighway to erupt from Iran and race through Iraq, Syria and Jordan to the edge of Israel? America
might not just see its global geo-energy position undermined, but could
see a set of falling dominoes among Sunni Arab states that could
dramatically remake the map of the Middle East -- and not in America's favor.

 

In other words, the task was to ponder what each of these bleak binary choices meant for America.
They are often framed as "bombing" vs. "appeasement." The emerging
polite term for the appeasement option is "strategic readjustment."

 

After
the session, two Bush administration senior officials who were not
present sent me letters, one to say the binary "to bomb or not to bomb"
scenario was premature, the other to say it was not premature.

 

But a
former administration official who was present at the session
vigorously and emphatically embraced the either/or formula. He also had
this to share about the inner workings of the Bush White House on Iran and the inevitability of military action:

 

  • The
    President is going to receive a memo -- some time in the next 6 to 12
    months -- that presents a "bleak binary choice". Either he takes action
    to preempt Iran from reaching a nuclear threshold and calls for a
    military strike or he stands down and accepts a future with Iran with
    nuclear weapons.
     
  • Condi's
    job is to develop a "third option". She will dance round and round,
    waltzing with that third option. She will dance faster and faster with
    it, spinning and spinning, all around she'll go -- but when she's done
    she'll see that she's dancing with a corpse.
       
  • This
    President is the kind of president who believes it is his moral
    responsibility to address serious problems now and not to leave these
    tough actions to a successor.
       
  • Those
    are the cold, harsh realities that we face -- and to me, as I look
    ahead, I don't see how we come out of this without military action.
    Unless Iran abandons its nuclear weapons intentions, which I don't see
    happening, there will be a war.

 

So 15
months later, the president has now, presumably, received that memo,
and those who hold the deterministic view that bombing Iran is around
the corner could argue that they are in good company.

 

To try
to discern what the president himself thinks, however, is very
difficult. It's particularly hard when Bush is trying to convince Iran
that the military option is real, and that if Iran doesn't work out a
mutually acceptable deal with the U.S., he will launch a strike.

 

To
date, however, nothing suggests Bush is really going to do it. If he
were, he wouldn't be playing good cop/bad cop with Iran and proposing
engagement. If the bombs were at the ready, Bush would be doing a lot
more to prepare the nation and the military for a war far more
consequential than the invasion of Iraq.

 

There is also circumstantial evidence that he has decided bombing may be too costly a choice.

 

First,
journalist Joe Klein documents a December 2006 meeting in which Bush
met in "the Tank" with his senior national security counselors and the
military's command staff and walked out with the impression that either
the costs of military action against Iran were simply too high, or that
the prospects for success for the mission too low.

 

Klein writes:

 

    Then
Bush asked about the possibility of a successful attack on Iran's
nuclear capability. He was told that the U.S. could launch a
devastating air attack on Iran's government and military, wiping out
the Iranian air force, the command and control structure and some of
the more obvious nuclear facilities. But the Chiefs were -- once again
-- unanimously opposed to taking that course of action.

 

    Why?
Because our intelligence inside Iran is very sketchy. There was no way
to be sure that we could take out all of Iran's nuclear facilities.
Furthermore, the Chiefs warned, the Iranian response in Iraq and, quite
possibly, in terrorist attacks on the U.S. could be devastating. Bush
apparently took this advice to heart and went to Plan B -- a covert
destabilization campaign reported earlier this week by ABC News.

 

After
this meeting, Bush immediately tilted away from the Cheney-dominant
view that military action was the most preferable course and empowered
and released other parts of his administration to animate a third
option.

 

Secondly,
we know via material first reported on my blog, the Washington Note,
and subsequently confirmed by the New York Times, Time and Newsweek,
that Cheney and his team have been deeply frustrated by the "engage
Iran team" that the president empowered and felt that they were losing
ground to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of Defense
Robert Gates, Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell and the
president's new chief of staff, Joshua Bolten.

 

One
member of Cheney's national security staff, David Wurmser, worried out
loud that Cheney felt that his wing was "losing the policy argument on
Iran" inside the administration -- and that they might need to "end
run" the president with scenarios that may narrow his choices.

 

The option that Wurmser allegedly discussed was nudging Israel to launch a low-yield cruise missile strike against the Natanz nuclear reactor in Iran, thus "hopefully" prompting a military reaction by Tehran against U.S. forces in Iraq
and the Gulf. When queried about Wurmser's alleged comments, a senior
Bush administration official told the New York Times, "The vice
president is not necessarily responsible for every single thing that
comes out of the mouth of every single member of his staff."

 

We
know Bush rebuffed Cheney's view and is seeking other alternatives.
That is the most clear evidence that Bush is not committed to bombing Iran.
Even if Bush wanted to make the Iranians believe that he could go
either way -- diplomacy or military strike -- Bush would not so clearly
knock back one side in favor of the other to the point where the "bad
cops" in a good cop/bad cop strategy would tell anyone on the outside
that they did not enjoy the favor and support of the president.

 

Bush is aware that America's intelligence on Iran is weak. Even without admitting America's blind spots on Iraq, the intelligence failures on Iraq's WMD program create a formidable credibility hurdle.

 

Bush knows that the American military is stretched and that bombing Iran would not be a casual exercise. Reprisals in the Gulf toward U.S. forces and Iran's ability to cut off supply lines to the 160,000 U.S. troops currently deployed in Iraq could seriously endanger the entire American military.

 

Bush can also see China and Russia waiting in the wings, not to promote conflict but to take advantage of self-destructive missteps that the United States takes that would give them more leverage over and control of global energy flows. Iran has the third-largest undeveloped oil reserves in the world and the second-largest undeveloped natural gas reserves.

 

Bush also knows that Iran controls "the temperature" of the terror networks it runs. Bombing Iran would blow the control gauge off, and Iran's terror networks could mobilize throughout the Middle East, Afghanistan and even the United States.

 

In sum, Bush does not plan to escalate toward a direct military conflict with Iran,
at least not now -- and probably not later. The costs are too high, and
there are still many options to be tried before the worst of all
options is put back on the table.

 

As it stands today, he wants that "third option," even if Cheney doesn't. Bush's war-prone team failed him on Iraq, and this time he'll be more reserved, more cautious. That is why a classic buildup to war with Iran, one in which the decision to bomb has already been made, is not something we should be worried about today.

 

What
we should worry about, however, is the continued effort by the neocons
to shore up their sagging influence. They now fear that events and
arguments could intervene to keep what once seemed like a "nearly
inevitable" attack from happening. They know that they must keep up the
pressure on Bush and maintain a drumbeat calling for war.

 

They
are doing exactly this during September and October in a series of
meetings organized by the American Enterprise Institute on Iran and Iraq designed to reemphasize the case for hawkish, interventionist deployments in Iraq and a military, regime-change-oriented strike against Iran. And through Op-Eds and the serious political media, the "bomb Iran
now" crowd believes they must undermine those in and out of government
proposing alternatives to bombing and keep the president and his people
saturated with pro-war mantras.

 

We
should also worry about the kind of scenario David Wurmser floated,
meaning an engineered provocation. An "accidental war" would escalate
quickly and "end run," as Wurmser put it, the president's diplomatic,
intelligence and military decision-making apparatus. It would most
likely be triggered by one or both of the two people who would see
their political fortunes rise through a new conflict -- Cheney and
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

 

That kind of war is much more probable and very much worth worrying about.

 

___

 

 

News ... 

 

Beyond a Binary Choice: Thinking the Unthinkables on Iran

 

"In the Tank" - Cheney's Iran Fantasy

 


David Wurmser leaving Cheney's office  ...

 

Profile

 

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